Thesis Statement:
Sea-based Ballistic Missile Defense offers the most feasible protection for the
United States
than Land-based Ballistic Missile Defense.
The notion of ballistic missile
defense (BMD) isn’t novel. It initially surfaced in the premature years of the
Cold War as part and parcel of the general strategic contest between the USA
and the Soviet Union[1].
The conception that ballistic missiles might be interrupted and shattered while
in flight provided the panorama of a scheme of safety founded upon a “dynamic
defense” as opposed to the frightening concept of safety founded on mutual
assured destruction by distasteful forces[2].
II. Ballistic Missile
i. Definition and Uses
A
ballistic missile may be defined as a missile which has a ballistic flight over
the largest part of its flight path. This is in spite of whether or not it’s a
weapon -delivery vehicle.
The
missile is simply steered throughout the comparatively short preliminary
powered stage of flight. Furthermore, its route is consequently ruled by the
laws of orbital technicalities and ballistics. So far, ballistic missiles
have been impelled throughout powered flight by means of chemical rocket.
Ballistic
missiles are grouped in accordance with their range, the greatest distance gauged
alongside the plane of the globe's ellipsoid that is, starting from the position
of setting off of a ballistic missile to the position of impact of the final component
of its consignment. Ballistic missiles are grouped into two
broad categories i.e. land-based or sea-based. A variety of systems are employed by various nations of the
world to classify the land-based ballistic missiles. The USA splits
land-based ballistic
missiles into 4 range divisions. The
first division is the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). This missile
is capable of covering a distance of over five thousand five hundred (5, 500) kilometers.
The second division is the Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM). This missile
is capable of traversing a distance of between three thousand (3,000)
kilometers and five thousand five hundred (5, 500) kilometers. The third
division is the Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM). This missile can
traverse a distance of between one thousand (1,000) and three
thousand (3, 000) kilometers. The last division is the Short-Range Ballistic
missile (SRBM) which is capable of traversing a distance of up to one thousand
(1, 000) kilometers[3]. An
example of a sea-based ballistic missile is the submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM). This missile is launched from a ballistic
missile submarine. The present blueprints of the sub-marine launched ballistic
missile have
global range. Both short and
medium-range missiles are frequently jointly known as theater/ tactical
ballistic missiles. Long- and medium-range ballistic
missiles are in general devised in order to convey nuclear weapons. This is
attributed to the fact that their
payload is too limited for usual explosives to be proficient[4].
ii. Phases
Missile defense systems may be split
into 3 major classes relying on what fraction of the trajectory of the ingoing missile;
the interceptor is devised to target:
- Boost-phase
In this phase, the defense system is
devised in order to interrupt throughout the boost phase of the attacking
missile that is, within the preliminary minutes following its setting off and prior
to the missile discharging its war-heads.
- Terminal Phase
In this
phase, the
missile warhead is interrupted in the ultimate phase of its trajectory. It is
interrupted as it re-penetrates the air soon prior to arriving at its target.
- Mid-phase
In this phase, the defense scheme traverses the region
amid the two phases (boost-phase and terminal phase). At this point the warhead
is interrupted subsequent to its discharge by the missile, although prior to its
re-penetration the air.
A missile that is in boost phase is
usually the simplest target. This is due to the fact that the missile motor
offers an extremely noticeable heat signature. The other reason is that the rocket
and warhead are still as one. Conversely, the boost phase is short. To target a
missile efficiently at this instant necessitates relative immediacy to the
launch location. The mid-course phase is the lengthiest. However no rocket motor
heat signature exists. Furthermore, the missile is extremely far from the earth’s
surface. As a result, the interception becomes more complex. The re-entrance
phase offers heat signatures from the payload constituents. However, they’re minute
and are traveling at velocities which make them hard to target[5].
III. Ballistic Missile Defense Systems
Land-Based BMD System
A land-based
ballistic missile defense system is made up of three main elements. The first
part is the Ex-Exo Atmospheric Kill Vehicle. The second element is the GBI-
Ground Based interceptor. The final element is the X-band radar. All the three
parts of the land-based ballistic defense system have morphology with attack means
against ingoing missiles and their payload. This results to the depression
countermeasure tactics in addition to the capability by the defenses to organize
rendezvous tactics. This system is usually
layered. Therefore it has the ability of carting off the plan from the
attacker. Owing to the fact that the land-based ballistic system is
multi-layered, it permits extra effectual defense. Furthermore, it permits an advanced
capability to safeguard targets.
The land-based
ballistic missile defense system has a superior sense of mobility. This
property permits its protections to react to modifications within the subsequent
peril. As a result, it strengthens fixed protections and successfully tackling
the surfacing of novel perils. Nevertheless, these kinds of portable protections
may turn out to be trivially politically possible for pals to agree to in
preference to fixed organization. This system should be able to conduct a
series of composite responsibilities in roughly six minutes for a Scud-type missile[6].
The ingoing peril should be spotted: intelligence sources may
possibly offer premonition that a missile attack is possible, and satellite or in-flight scrutiny may spot the distinctive infra-red
‘signature’ from a missile launch. The radar
present on the land would subsequently centre in the course of
the peril and attempt to cut off the extremely feeble reflection from a BM. Then, the ‘target’ should be confirmed and the
peril assessed (from its headline, characteristic and the location the fragments
may possibly drop if the BM is shattered). A command verdict is needed, in
order to authorize the commencement of a counter-offensive bearing in mind
every recognized state of affairs prior to passing on the entire strategic
information to the fire control system,
which ought to work out a cut off point, decide, arm and fire the correct
interceptor rounds.
The chore of interruption itself is veto mean deed
- with ultimate velocities of equal to ten kilometers per second (10km/s). In
actual fact, it might be even more tricky, owing to the fact that the RV(reentry
vehicle) may organize ‘decoys’ in order to
bewilder the interceptor, or fragments from the booster or RV(reentry vehicle) covering might have the similar result
creating a ‘peril cloud’
inside which the RV(reentry vehicle) ought to be targeted. As a result the accomplishment
of whichever single interceptor is beyond from definite, and a ‘probability of kill’ of fifty
to eighty percent (50-80%) characteristically is maintained. With the aim of advancing
the likelihood of accomplishment, interceptors ought to be fired off in violent
flow, by means of a ‘layered’ defense that might possibly lessen the entire number
of rounds needed by concluding the progression once the RV (reentry vehicle)
has been shattered[7].
o
Strengths
A land-based ballistic missile
characteristic boost phase weapon scheme allows impending operation sites to be
predefined. Additionally, it supports the functionality that has been set up exclusive
of sauntering the general visibility of the dedication to shielding forward. This
scheme can connect ballistic missiles in the boost phase in addition to tackling
other target categories. Second, a land-based ballistic missile has the merit of
premeditated litheness and premeditated mobility and whichever key field may
serve as an operational site for these systems. Third, owing to the fact that this
kind of ballistic missile defense system has identical twin missile motor and booster
which serves as the block for the 1st and 2nd stages, it
is capable of backing a great range of an exo-atmospheric intercept that offers
the trailing information.
This information is swiftly conveyed to the regulation
assemblage directing the reroute impulsion scheme. The reroute impulsion scheme
has an advantage of making use of information space founded sensor.
Furthermore, it has the advantage of making use of signals from diverse sensors
from other components of the guard schemes. However exterior cues or even the sensors
data might not be required from the ballistic missile defense. Fourth, the
manner in which the land-based ballistic missile has been devised enables it to
offer independent utilities. These utilities have the capability tracking and
spotting targets.
Fifth, the land-based ballistic missile
defense system is fitted with bias algorithms, and therefore it is able to
contrast capable items in the target region so as to verify the items to cut
off, magnifying complicated perils with assorted target components, fragments,
countermeasures. Last, this ballistic
missile defense system has depicted basic discrimination capabilities for
unitary perils and as a result it can provide fortification against uncertified
and unintentional missile launches.
o
Weaknesses
The land-based ballistic missile
defense system is associated with a number of weaknesses. First, its operating
needs are quite demanding. Furthermore, the supports of infiltration for the anticipated
perils are quite straining. Second, the mission of this system necessitates
immense trails of exposure so as to safeguard the projected region at whichever
instance. Last, the land-based ballistic defense system ought to constantly sustain
an elevated promptness tempo so that it can act in response to unanticipated
launches[8].
Instances Used
o
Successes
Land-based
ballistic missile abilities persist to escalate with the propagation of missile
technology. Land-based BMs have been utilized in a number of wars over the last
twenty years, comprising of first the Iran-Iraq war. Second, land-based
ballistic missile defense systems were utilized during the Afghan civil war.
Third, the land-based ballistic missile defense systems were used during the conflict
in Yemen, the nineteen ninety one (1991) and two thousand and three (2003)
Persian Gulf conflicts. Last, the land-based ballistic military defense system
was utilized during the Russian military action in Chechnya.
o Failures
More
than 20 nations of the world possess the land-based ballistic missile defense
systems and it is anticipated that the missiles shall turn out to be a
prospective combats engrossing the United States armed forces. The
usage of the SCUD missiles in the Gulf War is a perfect example on how the
shorter-range land-based ballistic missile defense system may possibly facade a
risk in the hands of specific countries or even terrorist groups. The SCUDs
that were utilized during the Gulf war were annihilated; however other counties
are obtaining the Theatre Ballistic Missiles which prospectively places United States of America
in a striking array of politically unsteady areas.
The
traditional high explosive Theatre Ballistic Missiles that were employed during
the year nineteen hundred and one (1991) Gulf War one, in which the thirty
eight (38) altered Scuds that were fired by Iraq at Israel assassinated 2 and
harmed approximately two hundred and thirty (230) other civilians. During the
war, one Scud closely failed to target an associated alliance armory in Saudi Arabia. At
the moment, high explosive Theatre Ballistic Missiles aren’t adequately correct
to be extremely practical militarily, however they may possibly all the same
strike dread into inhabitant populations.
Sea Based AEGIS BMD System
A sea-based ballistic missile
defense system is mainly used to complement the land-based ballistic defense
system. This is attributed to the fact that the sea-based missile ballistic
missile defense system offers extra heftiness and functional litheness as
opposed to the land-based ballistic missile defense system. The sea-based is
nonetheless feasible in the long-run. It is capable of lessening the
susceptibility of sea-based radars to safeguard cruelty attack. Owing to this
capability, it can convey supplementary effective kill likelihood via addition
of previously engagement chances. A sea-based ballistic missile system is very
robust. This robustness is attributed to the fact that it possesses elevated
mobility. In addition, its platform provides adequate infallible safeguard
against ballistic missiles that can be launched by a ship. The sea-based
ballistic missile defense is made up of two main elements. The first element is
the dedicated ships. The second element is the sea-based interceptors[9].
The deployment of the sea-based
ballistic missile defense system engrosses the adjustments of the incorporated paraphernalia.
It also incorporates the adjustment of the as computer programs. These programs
control the interceptor that is devoted to the progression of the standardized assortment
of directed missiles. A sea-based missile is made up of 3 interceptors. The
first interceptor is the sea-based interceptor. This interceptor is combined
with exterior sensors and land-based interceptors. The second interceptor is
the stand alone sea-based interceptors. These interceptors provide augmented
heftiness and lessened peril. The third and ultimate interceptor is the
sea-based interceptor which is made use of by or exclusive of backing from
exterior sensors in order to provide all-inclusive BMD. The sea-based ballistic
system is made up of a premature warning and tracking to provide premature and above
the horizon information to the interceptor. This interceptor is responsible for
resolving the quantity of kinematic trail it might utilize for engagement. The
radar offers backing for diverse engagements of the system. This is attributed to
its hefty trailing and recognition abilities for tactical ballistics missiles in
addition to their RVs, which are backed by means of a powerful sensor[10].
The burnout speed of a sea-based ballistic missile system determines the optimal
kinematic quarter which the interceptor may traverse cover and as a consequence
its least amount of instigate zones[11].
How works in each phase
o
Strengths
The strengths of sea-based ballistic
missile defense systems consist of the following:
First, the sea-based BMD may
possibly perform ballistic missile defense operations from sites at sea which
are prospectively valuable for ballistic missile defense operations although unreachable
to ground-based ballistic missile defense systems.
Second, sea-based ballistic missile
defense schemes may be maneuvered in forward sites in intercontinental waters
exclusive of necessitate for negotiating base admission from other countries, and
exclusive of limitations from overseas governments on the manner in which they may possibly be
utilized.
Third, sea-based ballistic missile
defense may possibly operate perspective from onlookers aground. This capability
makes them prospectively less discernible and less offensive.
Fourth, sea-based systems have an
enhanced mobility. Those navy ships that are equipped with ballistic missile
defense schemes may gamely shift themselves to in response to shifting demands
for ballistic missile defense abilities or to avoid exposure and targeting by
opponent forces, and may achieve so exclusive of fixing demands on United States airlift
assets.
With regards to the aforementioned
first strength of the sea-based ballistic missile defense system, four ways in
which a site may possibly be valuable for United States ballistic missile defense
operations exists:
First, the site may possibly lie alongside
a BM’s prospective flight lane, which may perhaps make easy trailing and cutting
off the attacking missile.
Second, the site could allow sea-based
radar to examine a BM (ballistic missile) from a diverse angle than other United States ballistic missile defense sensors,
which may perhaps allow the United
States ballistic missile defense system to
trail the attacking missile with enhanced efficiency.
Third, if a prospective opponent’s BM
launchers are comparatively near to its coast, subsequently a United States
Navy ship outfitted with ballistic missile defense interceptors which is functioning
comparatively near to that coast might try to safeguard a big down-range landscape
against prospective attack by BM fired from those launchers.
Last. If a Navy ship were outfitted with extremely
fast interceptors and if that navy ship were deployed to an abroad site comparatively
next to opponent BM launchers, the ship may perhaps manage to try to cut off
BMs fired from those launchers throughout the missiles’ boost stage of flight-
the preliminary stage, in which the BMs’ missile engines are burning. A BM in the
boost phase of voyage is a moderately big, hot-burning target which could be
simpler to cut off (partially since the missile is voyaging moderately unhurriedly
and is gamely spotted by radar), and the fragments from a rocket cut off all
through its boost stage may possibly be supplementary possibly to not drop on
or close to the projected position of the attacking missile.
- Weaknesses
The weaknesses of sea-based
ballistic missile defense systems consist of the following:
First, the process of employing multi-mission Navy cruisers
and destroyers for ballistic missile defense operations may possibly diminish
their capability to execute other missions, for instance air-defense operations
against aircraft and anti-ship cruise missile and anti-submarine combat operations.
There are four reasons that trigger this drawback: firstly, performing
ballistic missile defense operations may possibly necessitate ship to function
in a site that’s inappropriate for conducting one or extra other missions. Secondly,
performing ballistic missile defense operations may possibly lessen a ship’s capability
to perform air-defense operations against aircraft and cruise rockets. This is
attributed due to restrictions on ship radar capabilities. Thirdly, ballistic
missile defense interceptors are fitted inside ship weapon-launch tubes which
may perhaps or else be utilized for air-defense and antisubmarine weapons.
Lastly, the process of launching a ballistic missile defense interceptor from a
submarine may possibly confer away the submarine’s site, which could make the
missile additionally complex for the submarine to accomplish missions which
necessitate silent operations and prospectively expose the submarine to extra susceptible
to attack.
Talking of
USA, the second weakness of the sea-based ballistic missile defense system is
that the process of sustaining a standing existence of a ballistic missile ship
in a site in which other Navy missions don’t necessitate such kind of a
deployment, and in which there is no close home port, could necessitate an entire
dedication of numerous Navy ships, owing to the mathematics of sustaining Navy
ship forward deployments.
Last, extremely rough waters could slow
down a crew’s capability to control a ship’s schemes, as well as its ballistic
missile defense schemes, prospectively forming intermittent gaps in ballistic
missile coverage.
o
Successes
The Aegis system was initially deployed by the United States
Navy in nineteen eighty three (1983). The design of the Aegis Ballistic Missile
Defense scheme which has been analyzed so far is anticipated to bring down
shorter-range ballistic missiles. The Ballistic Missile Defense scheme is being
expanded as an expansion of the prevailing Aegis air defense scheme, and could
thus profit from the verified radar, software, and interceptor technology of
that scheme, in which the land-based midcourse scheme is being expanded
essentially as a comparatively novel weapon scheme. From the first month of the
year two thousand and two (2002) to November of the year two thousand and eight
(2008), the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense scheme has accomplished fourteen
(14) triumphant exo-atmospheric intercepts in eighteen (18) trials. This figure
consists of 1 triumphant and 1 intercept by Japanese Aegis ships in 2 Japanese
test flights. The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense scheme has in addition accomplished
two endo-atmospheric intercepts in two trials attempts, for a joint sum of
sixteen (16) triumphant exo- and endo-atmospheric intercepts in twenty (20)
trials. An Aegis test that was conducted on April the twenty six (26) of 2007 in
USA
engrossed the concurrent engagements of a BM “unitary” target. This implies
that the target warhead and booster stay attached. This test depicted the Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense scheme capability to engage a BM peril and protect
itself from attack simultaneously.
Furthermore, it
depicted the efficiency of engineering, production, and mission declaration amendments
within the SDACS that is Solid Divert and Attitude Control System.
- Failures
The nation of Japan curiosity in Ballistic Missile Defense
system, and in collaboration with USA on the subject of sea-based Ballistic
Missile Defense was intensified in August of the year nineteen hundred and
ninety eight (1998). During this period, North Korea
test-fired a Taepo Dond- 1 BM flew above Japan
subsequent to dropping into the Pacific Ocean.
Japan’s
Ballistic Missile tests engrossed a solitary Ballistic Missile target. This
test didn’t lead to the triumphant intercept. An Aegis BMD test by the Japanese
destroyer Chokai resulted in failure. The Standard Missile-3 Block 1A
interceptor lost trail of the target missile in the ultimate moments prior to a
designed hit-to-kill[12].
Comparison
The following are some of the comparisons
regarding the land-based and sea-based BMD
o
Easy
of Use
First, in terms
of costs, a Sea-based Ballistic Missile Defense system is much more costly to
purchase than an a corresponding ground- based system owing to the prospective requirement to engineer the
Sea-based system in order to resist the acidic
marine milieu.
Second,
in terms of operational costs, a sea based Ballistic Missile Defense system
might be additionally costly to operate and back than a corresponding
ground-based system owing to the maintenance expenses related with operating
the ship in the marine milieu and the requirement for a crew of numerous sizes to operate the ship.
o
Mobility
A
land-based system has a superior sense of mobility. This aspect permits its
protections to react to modifications in the resulting peril, strengthening set
protections and successfully tackling the surfacing of novel perils4.
On the other hand, a sea-based ballistic missile system is hefty owing to its
elevated mobility, its platform providing infallible defense against ship
launched BMs.
o
Capability
First, sea-based
Ballistic Missile Defense system which is operating within a forward site may
possibly be more susceptible to foe attack than a ground-based Ballistic
Missile Defense, mainly a ground-based system positioned within a less-forward site. Protecting a
sea-based system against prospective attack might necessitate the existence of
extra Navy ships or other forces.
Second, the
land-based system offers the most effectual and heftiness defense owing to its
huge battle-space, coverage and engagement ability. The sea-based system input
to protection of a TBM is at its peak when the baseline of land-based systems isn’t completely deployed.
Third,
a sea-based system which has both upper and lower tiers is extremely effectual.
It is the most excellent option in a catastrophe circumstance, which, by
description, excludes land-based systems.
Last,
owing to the fact that the sea-based system is equipped with interceptors estimated performance and the
capability to forward deploy the ship in definite settings, it provided the
prospective to accomplish ascent phase intercepts.
Success Rates Based on Testing
A valuable test on either sea-based
or land-based ballistic missile system might be conducted by bearing in mind how
sound it would handle 3 escalating challenges.
v Threat Growth
A resolution with incessant coverage of opponent
missiles, from gradient via delayed midcourse, would necessitate fewer
interceptors than a sporadic system to accomplish the similar outcomes.
v Geographic
Uncertainty and Distribution
The deployable schemes may possibly offer
almost intercontinental relying on tactical warning. For a sea-based ballistic
missile defense system, such warning requires simply be days sufficient to react
in the kind of disaster in which a rascal BM peril with Weapons of Mass
Destruction would take place.
v Threat Sophistication
Boost-phase
intercept when viable is the best way to conquer the many countermeasures. This
is attributed to the fact that the chance to intercept prior to majority of the
countermeasures may be utilized10.
During the
testing of the Theatre High Altitude Area
Defense, the system experienced several problems. The
failures in these tests were discovered to be subsystems normally deemed to be
of little peril. These failures were specifically caused by poor blueprint and
manufacture, insufficient ground inspection regulation, and pressures to shift
to the subsequent stage.
In comparing the
two types of defense systems, higher success rates of testing are achieved by
the sea-based system[13].
Future of Each System
The Aegis system in its present design
is projected to trail BM of every range, as well as Intercontinental BMs. It is
also designed to intercept shorter-ranged BMs. This Aegis however does not have
the capabilities of intercepting Intercontinental BMs. Therefore,
Therefore, potential editions of the Aegis
Ballistic Missile Defense system ought to incorporate a quicker interceptor premeditated
to intercept certain Intercontinental BMs.
The interceptors of the land-based
Ballistic Missile should be designed in such a way that they are able to intercept
ingoing missiles at elevated altitudes. All the manufactured land-based
Ballistic Missiles should be able to safeguard the United States forces, pals and
interests from Ballistic Missiles from its enemies. Provided that the USA persists
to forward-base its armed-forces abroad, sustain security commitments with pals
and preserve the guiding principle alternative to arbitrate in regional predicaments
and clashes, it might anticipate having to deal with the propagation of BMs and
their use by future opponents[14].
Even though it stays vague if deploying
land-based systems may perhaps assist discourage regional hostility, land
–based systems would offer the USA a supplementary military alternative with
regional opponents[15].
IV. Conclusion
In comparing the two kinds of Ballistic
Missile Defense systems, the sea-based defense system would be most viable as a
result of its robustness and effectiveness. Due to these aspects, the sea-based
defense system will guarantee that the USA is safeguarded from almost all
its foes in spite of the fact that it is unfriendly to the taxpayers owing to
the high maintenance costs associated with it.
Therefore the hypothesis that sea-based
Ballistic Missile Systems offers the most feasible protection for the United States
than Land-based Ballistic Missile Defense is correct.
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