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Tuesday 12 March 2013

Comparison of Land- based and Sea- Based Ballistic Missile Defense


Thesis Statement: Sea-based Ballistic Missile Defense offers the most feasible protection for the United States than Land-based Ballistic Missile Defense.
The notion of ballistic missile defense (BMD) isn’t novel. It initially surfaced in the premature years of the Cold War as part and parcel of the general strategic contest between the USA and the Soviet Union[1]. The conception that ballistic missiles might be interrupted and shattered while in flight provided the panorama of a scheme of safety founded upon a “dynamic defense” as opposed to the frightening concept of safety founded on mutual assured destruction by distasteful forces[2].

II. Ballistic Missile

           i.      Definition and Uses

A ballistic missile may be defined as a missile which has a ballistic flight over the largest part of its flight path. This is in spite of whether or not it’s a weapon -delivery vehicle.
The missile is simply steered throughout the comparatively short preliminary powered stage of flight. Furthermore, its route is consequently ruled by the laws of orbital technicalities and ballistics. So far, ballistic missiles have been impelled throughout powered flight by means of chemical rocket.
Ballistic missiles are grouped in accordance with their range, the greatest distance gauged alongside the plane of the globe's ellipsoid that is, starting from the position of setting off of a ballistic missile to the position of impact of the final component of its consignment. Ballistic missiles are grouped into two broad categories i.e. land-based or sea-based. A variety of systems are employed by various nations of the world to classify the land-based ballistic missiles. The USA splits land-based ballistic missiles into 4 range divisions.  The first division is the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). This missile is capable of covering a distance of over five thousand five hundred (5, 500) kilometers. The second division is the Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM). This missile is capable of traversing a distance of between three thousand (3,000) kilometers and five thousand five hundred (5, 500) kilometers. The third division is the Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM). This missile can traverse a distance of between one thousand (1,000) and   three thousand (3, 000) kilometers. The last division is the Short-Range Ballistic missile (SRBM) which is capable of traversing a distance of up to one thousand (1, 000) kilometers[3]. An example of a sea-based ballistic missile is the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). This missile is launched from a ballistic missile submarine. The present blueprints of the sub-marine launched ballistic missile have  
Ballistic missile submarinA ballistic missile submarine is a submarine equipped to launch ballistic missiles .-Description:Ballistic missile submarines are larger than any other type of submarine, in order to accommodate SLBMs such as the Russian R-29 or the American Trident...global range. Both short and medium-range missiles are frequently jointly known as theater/ tactical ballistic missiles.
 Long- and medium-range ballistic missiles are in general devised in order to convey nuclear weapons. This is attributed to the fact that Nuclear weaponA nuclear weapon is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either fission or a combination of fistheir payload is too limited for usual explosives to be proficient[4].
   Tactical ballistic missileA tactical ballistic missile is a ballistic missile designed for short-range battlefield use. Typically range is less than 300 km. Tactical ballistic missiles are usually mobile to ensure survivability and quick deployment, as well as carrying a variety of warheads to target enemy facilities,...

         ii.      Phases   

Missile defense systems may be split into 3 major classes relying on what fraction of the trajectory of the ingoing missile; the interceptor is devised to target:
  • Boost-phase
In this phase, the defense system is devised in order to interrupt throughout the boost phase of the attacking missile that is, within the preliminary minutes following its setting off and prior to the missile discharging its war-heads.
  • Terminal Phase  
In this phase, the missile warhead is interrupted in the ultimate phase of its trajectory. It is interrupted as it re-penetrates the air soon prior to arriving at its target.
  • Mid-phase
In this phase, the defense scheme traverses the region amid the two phases (boost-phase and terminal phase). At this point the warhead is interrupted subsequent to its discharge by the missile, although prior to its re-penetration the air.
            A missile that is in boost phase is usually the simplest target. This is due to the fact that the missile motor offers an extremely noticeable heat signature. The other reason is that the rocket and warhead are still as one. Conversely, the boost phase is short. To target a missile efficiently at this instant necessitates relative immediacy to the launch location. The mid-course phase is the lengthiest. However no rocket motor heat signature exists. Furthermore, the missile is extremely far from the earth’s surface. As a result, the interception becomes more complex. The re-entrance phase offers heat signatures from the payload constituents. However, they’re minute and are traveling at velocities which make them hard to target[5].     

III. Ballistic Missile Defense Systems

Land-Based BMD System

A land-based ballistic missile defense system is made up of three main elements. The first part is the Ex-Exo Atmospheric Kill Vehicle. The second element is the GBI- Ground Based interceptor. The final element is the X-band radar. All the three parts of the land-based ballistic defense system have morphology with attack means against ingoing missiles and their payload. This results to the depression countermeasure tactics in addition to the capability by the defenses to organize rendezvous tactics.  This system is usually layered. Therefore it has the ability of carting off the plan from the attacker. Owing to the fact that the land-based ballistic system is multi-layered, it permits extra effectual defense. Furthermore, it permits an advanced capability to safeguard targets.
The land-based ballistic missile defense system has a superior sense of mobility. This property permits its protections to react to modifications within the subsequent peril. As a result, it strengthens fixed protections and successfully tackling the surfacing of novel perils. Nevertheless, these kinds of portable protections may turn out to be trivially politically possible for pals to agree to in preference to fixed organization. This system should be able to conduct a series of composite responsibilities in roughly six minutes for a Scud-type missile[6].  The ingoing peril should be spotted: intelligence sources may possibly offer premonition that a missile attack is possible, and satellite or in-flight scrutiny may spot the distinctive infra-red ‘signature’ from a missile launch. The radar present on the land would subsequently centre in the course of the peril and attempt to cut off the extremely feeble reflection from a BM.  Then, the ‘target’ should be confirmed and the peril assessed (from its headline, characteristic and the location the fragments may possibly drop if the BM is shattered). A command verdict is needed, in order to authorize the commencement of a counter-offensive bearing in mind every recognized state of affairs prior to passing on the entire strategic information to the fire control system, which ought to work out a cut off point, decide, arm and fire the correct interceptor rounds.
The chore of interruption itself is veto mean deed - with ultimate velocities of equal to ten kilometers per second (10km/s). In actual fact, it might be even more tricky, owing to the fact that the RV(reentry vehicle)  may organize ‘decoys’ in order to bewilder the interceptor, or fragments from the booster or RV(reentry vehicle)  covering might have the similar result creating a peril cloud’ inside which the RV(reentry vehicle)  ought to be targeted. As a result the accomplishment of whichever single interceptor is beyond from definite, and a probability of kill’ of fifty to eighty percent (50-80%) characteristically is maintained. With the aim of advancing the likelihood of accomplishment, interceptors ought to be fired off in violent flow, by means of a ‘layered’ defense that might possibly lessen the entire number of rounds needed by concluding the progression once the RV (reentry vehicle) has been shattered[7].
o   Strengths
            A land-based ballistic missile characteristic boost phase weapon scheme allows impending operation sites to be predefined. Additionally, it supports the functionality that has been set up exclusive of sauntering the general visibility of the dedication to shielding forward. This scheme can connect ballistic missiles in the boost phase in addition to tackling other target categories. Second, a land-based ballistic missile has the merit of premeditated litheness and premeditated mobility and whichever key field may serve as an operational site for these systems. Third, owing to the fact that this kind of ballistic missile defense system has identical twin missile motor and booster which serves as the block for the 1st and 2nd stages, it is capable of backing a great range of an exo-atmospheric intercept that offers the trailing information.
 This information is swiftly conveyed to the regulation assemblage directing the reroute impulsion scheme. The reroute impulsion scheme has an advantage of making use of information space founded sensor. Furthermore, it has the advantage of making use of signals from diverse sensors from other components of the guard schemes. However exterior cues or even the sensors data might not be required from the ballistic missile defense. Fourth, the manner in which the land-based ballistic missile has been devised enables it to offer independent utilities. These utilities have the capability tracking and spotting targets.
Fifth, the land-based ballistic missile defense system is fitted with bias algorithms, and therefore it is able to contrast capable items in the target region so as to verify the items to cut off, magnifying complicated perils with assorted target components, fragments, countermeasures.  Last, this ballistic missile defense system has depicted basic discrimination capabilities for unitary perils and as a result it can provide fortification against uncertified and unintentional missile launches.
o   Weaknesses
            The land-based ballistic missile defense system is associated with a number of weaknesses. First, its operating needs are quite demanding. Furthermore, the supports of infiltration for the anticipated perils are quite straining. Second, the mission of this system necessitates immense trails of exposure so as to safeguard the projected region at whichever instance. Last, the land-based ballistic defense system ought to constantly sustain an elevated promptness tempo so that it can act in response to unanticipated launches[8].

Instances Used

o   Successes
Land-based ballistic missile abilities persist to escalate with the propagation of missile technology. Land-based BMs have been utilized in a number of wars over the last twenty years, comprising of first the Iran-Iraq war. Second, land-based ballistic missile defense systems were utilized during the Afghan civil war. Third, the land-based ballistic missile defense systems were used during the conflict in Yemen, the nineteen ninety one (1991) and two thousand and three (2003) Persian Gulf conflicts. Last, the land-based ballistic military defense system was utilized during the Russian military action in Chechnya.
o   Failures
More than 20 nations of the world possess the land-based ballistic missile defense systems and it is anticipated that the missiles shall turn out to be a prospective combats engrossing the United States armed forces. The usage of the SCUD missiles in the Gulf War is a perfect example on how the shorter-range land-based ballistic missile defense system may possibly facade a risk in the hands of specific countries or even terrorist groups. The SCUDs that were utilized during the Gulf war were annihilated; however other counties are obtaining the Theatre Ballistic Missiles which prospectively places United States of America in a striking array of politically unsteady areas.
The traditional high explosive Theatre Ballistic Missiles that were employed during the year nineteen hundred and one (1991) Gulf War one, in which the thirty eight (38) altered Scuds that were fired by Iraq at Israel assassinated 2 and harmed approximately two hundred and thirty (230) other civilians. During the war, one Scud closely failed to target an associated alliance armory in Saudi Arabia. At the moment, high explosive Theatre Ballistic Missiles aren’t adequately correct to be extremely practical militarily, however they may possibly all the same strike dread into inhabitant populations.

Sea Based AEGIS BMD System

A sea-based ballistic missile defense system is mainly used to complement the land-based ballistic defense system. This is attributed to the fact that the sea-based missile ballistic missile defense system offers extra heftiness and functional litheness as opposed to the land-based ballistic missile defense system. The sea-based is nonetheless feasible in the long-run. It is capable of lessening the susceptibility of sea-based radars to safeguard cruelty attack. Owing to this capability, it can convey supplementary effective kill likelihood via addition of previously engagement chances. A sea-based ballistic missile system is very robust. This robustness is attributed to the fact that it possesses elevated mobility. In addition, its platform provides adequate infallible safeguard against ballistic missiles that can be launched by a ship. The sea-based ballistic missile defense is made up of two main elements. The first element is the dedicated ships. The second element is the sea-based interceptors[9].
The deployment of the sea-based ballistic missile defense system engrosses the adjustments of the incorporated paraphernalia. It also incorporates the adjustment of the as computer programs. These programs control the interceptor that is devoted to the progression of the standardized assortment of directed missiles. A sea-based missile is made up of 3 interceptors. The first interceptor is the sea-based interceptor. This interceptor is combined with exterior sensors and land-based interceptors. The second interceptor is the stand alone sea-based interceptors. These interceptors provide augmented heftiness and lessened peril. The third and ultimate interceptor is the sea-based interceptor which is made use of by or exclusive of backing from exterior sensors in order to provide all-inclusive BMD. The sea-based ballistic system is made up of a premature warning and tracking to provide premature and above the horizon information to the interceptor. This interceptor is responsible for resolving the quantity of kinematic trail it might utilize for engagement. The radar offers backing for diverse engagements of the system. This is attributed to its hefty trailing and recognition abilities for tactical ballistics missiles in addition to their RVs, which are backed by means of a powerful sensor[10]. The burnout speed of a sea-based ballistic missile system determines the optimal kinematic quarter which the interceptor may traverse cover and as a consequence its least amount of instigate zones[11].

How works in each phase

o   Strengths
The strengths of sea-based ballistic missile defense systems consist of the following:
First, the sea-based BMD may possibly perform ballistic missile defense operations from sites at sea which are prospectively valuable for ballistic missile defense operations although unreachable to ground-based ballistic missile defense systems.
Second, sea-based ballistic missile defense schemes may be maneuvered in forward sites in intercontinental waters exclusive of necessitate for negotiating base admission from other countries, and exclusive of limitations from overseas governments on  the manner in which they may possibly be utilized.
Third, sea-based ballistic missile defense may possibly operate perspective from onlookers aground. This capability makes them prospectively less discernible and less offensive.
Fourth, sea-based systems have an enhanced mobility. Those navy ships that are equipped with ballistic missile defense schemes may gamely shift themselves to in response to shifting demands for ballistic missile defense abilities or to avoid exposure and targeting by opponent forces, and may achieve so exclusive of  fixing demands on United States airlift assets.
With regards to the aforementioned first strength of the sea-based ballistic missile defense system, four ways in which a site may possibly be valuable for United States ballistic missile defense operations exists:
First, the site may possibly lie alongside a BM’s prospective flight lane, which may perhaps make easy trailing and cutting off the attacking missile.
Second, the site could allow sea-based radar to examine a BM (ballistic missile) from a diverse angle than other United States ballistic missile defense sensors, which may perhaps allow the United States ballistic missile defense system to trail the attacking missile with enhanced efficiency.
Third, if a prospective opponent’s BM launchers are comparatively near to its coast, subsequently a United States Navy ship outfitted with ballistic missile defense interceptors which is functioning comparatively near to that coast might try to safeguard a big down-range landscape against prospective attack by BM fired from those launchers.
Last.  If a Navy ship were outfitted with extremely fast interceptors and if that navy ship were deployed to an abroad site comparatively next to opponent BM launchers, the ship may perhaps manage to try to cut off BMs fired from those launchers throughout the missiles’ boost stage of flight- the preliminary stage, in which the BMs’ missile engines are burning. A BM in the boost phase of voyage is a moderately big, hot-burning target which could be simpler to cut off (partially since the missile is voyaging moderately unhurriedly and is gamely spotted by radar), and the fragments from a rocket cut off all through its boost stage may possibly be supplementary possibly to not drop on or close to the projected position of the attacking missile.
  • Weaknesses
The weaknesses of sea-based ballistic missile defense systems consist of the following:
First, the process of employing multi-mission Navy cruisers and destroyers for ballistic missile defense operations may possibly diminish their capability to execute other missions, for instance air-defense operations against aircraft and anti-ship cruise missile and anti-submarine combat operations. There are four reasons that trigger this drawback: firstly, performing ballistic missile defense operations may possibly necessitate ship to function in a site that’s inappropriate for conducting one or extra other missions. Secondly, performing ballistic missile defense operations may possibly lessen a ship’s capability to perform air-defense operations against aircraft and cruise rockets. This is attributed due to restrictions on ship radar capabilities. Thirdly, ballistic missile defense interceptors are fitted inside ship weapon-launch tubes which may perhaps or else be utilized for air-defense and antisubmarine weapons. Lastly, the process of launching a ballistic missile defense interceptor from a submarine may possibly confer away the submarine’s site, which could make the missile additionally complex for the submarine to accomplish missions which necessitate silent operations and prospectively expose the submarine to extra susceptible to attack.
            Talking of USA, the second weakness of the sea-based ballistic missile defense system is that the process of sustaining a standing existence of a ballistic missile ship in a site in which other Navy missions don’t necessitate such kind of a deployment, and in which there is no close home port, could necessitate an entire dedication of numerous Navy ships, owing to the mathematics of sustaining Navy ship forward deployments.
            Last, extremely rough waters could slow down a crew’s capability to control a ship’s schemes, as well as its ballistic missile defense schemes, prospectively forming intermittent gaps in ballistic missile coverage.
o   Successes
The Aegis system was initially deployed by the United States Navy in nineteen eighty three (1983). The design of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense scheme which has been analyzed so far is anticipated to bring down shorter-range ballistic missiles. The Ballistic Missile Defense scheme is being expanded as an expansion of the prevailing Aegis air defense scheme, and could thus profit from the verified radar, software, and interceptor technology of that scheme, in which the land-based midcourse scheme is being expanded essentially as a comparatively novel weapon scheme. From the first month of the year two thousand and two (2002) to November of the year two thousand and eight (2008), the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense scheme has accomplished fourteen (14) triumphant exo-atmospheric intercepts in eighteen (18) trials. This figure consists of 1 triumphant and 1 intercept by Japanese Aegis ships in 2 Japanese test flights. The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense scheme has in addition accomplished two endo-atmospheric intercepts in two trials attempts, for a joint sum of sixteen (16) triumphant exo- and endo-atmospheric intercepts in twenty (20) trials. An Aegis test that was conducted on April the twenty six (26) of 2007 in USA engrossed the concurrent engagements of a BM “unitary” target. This implies that the target warhead and booster stay attached. This test depicted the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense scheme capability to engage a BM peril and protect itself from attack simultaneously.
Furthermore, it depicted the efficiency of engineering, production, and mission declaration amendments within the SDACS that is Solid Divert and Attitude Control System.
  • Failures   
            The nation of Japan curiosity in Ballistic Missile Defense system, and in collaboration with USA on the subject of sea-based Ballistic Missile Defense was intensified in August of the year nineteen hundred and ninety eight (1998). During this period, North Korea test-fired a Taepo Dond- 1 BM flew above Japan subsequent to dropping into the Pacific Ocean. Japan’s Ballistic Missile tests engrossed a solitary Ballistic Missile target. This test didn’t lead to the triumphant intercept. An Aegis BMD test by the Japanese destroyer Chokai resulted in failure. The Standard Missile-3 Block 1A interceptor lost trail of the target missile in the ultimate moments prior to a designed hit-to-kill[12].

Comparison

The following are some of the comparisons regarding the land-based and sea-based BMD
o   Easy of Use
First, in terms of costs, a Sea-based Ballistic Missile Defense system is much more costly to purchase than an a corresponding ground- based system owing to the prospective requirement to engineer the Sea-based system  in order to resist the acidic marine milieu.
            Second, in terms of operational costs, a sea based Ballistic Missile Defense system might be additionally costly to operate and back than a corresponding ground-based system owing to the maintenance expenses related with operating the ship in the marine milieu and the requirement for a crew of numerous sizes to operate the ship.
o   Mobility
A land-based system has a superior sense of mobility. This aspect permits its protections to react to modifications in the resulting peril, strengthening set protections and successfully tackling the surfacing of novel perils4. On the other hand, a sea-based ballistic missile system is hefty owing to its elevated mobility, its platform providing infallible defense against ship launched BMs.
o   Capability
First, sea-based Ballistic Missile Defense system which is operating within a forward site may possibly be more susceptible to foe attack than a ground-based Ballistic Missile Defense, mainly a ground-based system positioned within a less-forward site. Protecting a sea-based system against prospective attack might necessitate the existence of extra Navy ships or other forces.
Second, the land-based system offers the most effectual and heftiness defense owing to its huge battle-space, coverage and engagement ability. The sea-based system input to protection of a TBM is at its peak when the baseline of land-based systems isn’t completely deployed.
Third, a sea-based system which has both upper and lower tiers is extremely effectual. It is the most excellent option in a catastrophe circumstance, which, by description, excludes land-based systems.
Last, owing to the fact that the sea-based system is equipped with interceptors estimated performance and the capability to forward deploy the ship in definite settings, it provided the prospective to accomplish ascent phase intercepts.

Success Rates Based on Testing

A valuable test on either sea-based or land-based ballistic missile system might be conducted by bearing in mind how sound it would handle 3 escalating challenges.
v  Threat Growth
 A resolution with incessant coverage of opponent missiles, from gradient via delayed midcourse, would necessitate fewer interceptors than a sporadic system to accomplish the similar outcomes.
v  Geographic Uncertainty and Distribution
 The deployable schemes may possibly offer almost intercontinental relying on tactical warning. For a sea-based ballistic missile defense system, such warning requires simply be days sufficient to react in the kind of disaster in which a rascal BM peril with Weapons of Mass Destruction would take place.
v  Threat Sophistication
Boost-phase intercept when viable is the best way to conquer the many countermeasures. This is attributed to the fact that the chance to intercept prior to majority of the countermeasures may be utilized10.
During the testing of the Theatre High Altitude Area Defense, the system experienced several problems. The failures in these tests were discovered to be subsystems normally deemed to be of little peril. These failures were specifically caused by poor blueprint and manufacture, insufficient ground inspection regulation, and pressures to shift to the subsequent stage.
In comparing the two types of defense systems, higher success rates of testing are achieved by the sea-based system[13].

Future of Each System

The Aegis system in its present design is projected to trail BM of every range, as well as Intercontinental BMs. It is also designed to intercept shorter-ranged BMs. This Aegis however does not have the capabilities of intercepting Intercontinental BMs. Therefore,
 Therefore, potential editions of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system ought to incorporate a quicker interceptor premeditated to intercept certain Intercontinental BMs.
            The interceptors of the land-based Ballistic Missile should be designed in such a way that they are able to intercept ingoing missiles at elevated altitudes. All the manufactured land-based Ballistic Missiles should be able to safeguard the United States forces, pals and interests from Ballistic Missiles from its enemies. Provided that the USA persists to forward-base its armed-forces abroad, sustain security commitments with pals and preserve the guiding principle alternative to arbitrate in regional predicaments and clashes, it might anticipate having to deal with the propagation of BMs and their use by future opponents[14].
 Even though it stays vague if deploying land-based systems may perhaps assist discourage regional hostility, land –based systems would offer the USA a supplementary military alternative with regional opponents[15].

IV. Conclusion

In comparing the two kinds of Ballistic Missile Defense systems, the sea-based defense system would be most viable as a result of its robustness and effectiveness. Due to these aspects, the sea-based defense system will guarantee that the USA is safeguarded from almost all its foes in spite of the fact that it is unfriendly to the taxpayers owing to the high maintenance costs associated with it.
Therefore the hypothesis that sea-based Ballistic Missile Systems offers the most feasible protection for the United States than Land-based Ballistic Missile Defense is correct.




References

“Ballistic Missile” Retrieved from http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Ballistic_missile
on 17 August 2010
Emelie Rutherford, “Pentagon Officials Eye Increasing Near-Term Ballistic Missile
Defense Assets In POM ‘10,” Defense Daily, April 18, 2008.
Frankel, Sherman, "Defeating Theater Missile Defense Radars with Active Decoys," Science &
Global Security, Vol. 6, 1997, pp. 333-355.
Garwin, Richard L., and Hans A. Bethe, "Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," Scientific American,
Vol. 218, No. 3, 1968, pp. 21-31
Michael Bruno, “MDA Looks to Double Aegis, THAAD Interceptor Production,”
Aerospace Daily & Defence Report, April 18, 2008: 1-2.
Nunn, S, The Changed Threat Environment of the 1990s. Congressional Record, Daily Edition,
vol. 136, Mar. 29, 1990, p.S.3444
 “Planning a Ballistic Missile Defense System of Systems” Retrieved from
http://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP181/index2.html on 18 August 2010
Rutherford, E, “Navy To Assume Responsibility for Sea-Based X-Band Radar
Program,” Inside the Navy, April 16, 2007.
Sirak, Michael C., "DoD, Industry: NMD Countermeasures Getting Attention," Inside Missile
Defense, Vol. 5, No. 10, May 19, 1999b, p. 1.
Sirak, Michael C., "Experts: Missile Defense Plan Neglects Countermeasures," Inside Missile
Defense, Vol. 5, No. 9, May 5, 1999a, p. 1.
Taylor, D, “Navy Still Interested in Second MKV, MDA Will Talk to Congress,” Inside the Navy, December 3, 2007
“THAAD Theatre High Altitude Area Defense - Missile System” Retrieved from
             www.army-technology.com/projects/thaad/ on 26th July, 2010
 “The Growing Importance of Ballistic Missile Defense” Retrieved from
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1374/MR1374.ch1.pdf on 17 August
2010




[1] C. Michael, Sirak, "Experts: Missile Defense Plan Neglects Countermeasures," Inside Missile Defense, Vol. 5, No. 9, May 5, 1999a, p. 1.
[2] “The Growing Importance of Ballistic Missile Defense” Retrieved from
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1374/MR1374.ch1.pdf on 17 August  2010
[3] C. Michael, Sirak, "Experts: Missile Defense Plan Neglects Countermeasures," Inside Missile Defense, Vol. 5, No. 9, May 5, 1999a, p. 1.
[4] “Ballistic Missile” Retrieved from http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Ballistic_missile on 17 August 2010
[5] Garwin, Richard L., and Hans A. Bethe, "Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," Scientific American,
Vol. 218, No. 3, 1968, pp. 21-31
[6]L. Richard, Garwin, and Hans,  Bethe, "Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," Scientific American, Vol. 218, No. 3, 1968, pp. 21-31
[7]P., Frankel, Sherman, "Defeating Theater Missile Defense Radars with Active Decoys," Science & Global Security, Vol. 6, 1997, pp. 333-355. 
[8] D., Taylor, “Navy Still Interested in Second MKV, MDA Will Talk to Congress,” Inside the Navy, December 3, 2007
[9] “THAAD Theatre High Altitude Area Defense - Missile System” Retrieved from  www.army-technology.com/projects/thaad/ on 26th July, 2010
[10] “Summary of Report to Congress on Utility of Sea-Based Assets to National Missile Defense.” Retrieved from www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/docs/seanmd.pdf on 26th July

[11] Maritime BMD Comes to the East Coast | Steeljaw Scribe” Retrieved from http://steeljawscribe.com/2008/09/03/maritime-BMD-comes-to-the-east-coast


[12] E, Rutherford, “Navy To Assume Responsibility for Sea-Based X-Band Radar Program,” Inside the Navy, April 16, 2007.
[13] “Planning a Ballistic Missile Defense System of Systems” Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP181/index2.html on 18 August 2010
[14] R., Emelie, “Pentagon Officials Eye Increasing Near-Term Ballistic Missile Defense Assets In POM ‘10,” Defense Daily, April 18, 2008.
[15] D., Taylor, “Navy Still Interested in Second MKV, MDA Will Talk to Congress,” Inside the Navy, December 3, 2007

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